I’m celebrating tonight. I’m delighted.

When I was aged about 17, I wondered if it would be possible to figure out where an orbiting rock went, by calculating its motion step by step over short intervals of time. But I couldn’t see how to do it, and it would be pretty laborious to calculate it all using a slide rule (remember them?) even if I did. But I never forgot the idea. There’s a book of mine somewhere which has got a curve drawn in it made up of straight line segments.

Go forward 30 years, and I was sitting with a physicist friend of mine in a pub in Bristol, smoking and drinking. And I asked him how easy it would be to write a computer programme to do that. “It’s quite straightforward,” he said. I asked him to explain. And there and then in the pub he sketched out how to do it on the back of an envelope.

I started work on it the very next day. And within a few hours, I had a rock going round a central sun. The only trouble was that, instead of going in a circle or ellipse, it slowly spiralled outwards (or maybe inwards, I can’t remember). So I went back to my physicist friend, and asked him why it was happening. He was puzzled, and went away to think about it. He even wrote his own simulation model. And he got the same result. But a few days later he came back and said, “I know what the problem is. I told you that in order to calculate the distance a body travels, you have to use the equation s = u.t + ½.a.t2. Well, that’s wrong. And it’s wrong because that equation is an integral. But our model is doing the integration as it goes along. So we’re integrating twice. It should just be s = u.t.” And after that the rocks started going round in circles and ellipses.

Wind forward another 20 years. I’ve now built up that same simulation model to include the entire solar system, and I’m able to get the positions of rocks from NASA, and I’ve even got a little spinning Earth with a map of the world drawn on it. But now I was finding that my model wasn’t really very accurate. The Earth went round the Sun in anything between 364 and 366 days. About right, but not very accurate. I’d been using a simple Euler approximation, and it was very approximate. But there was another way of calculating the motion which effectively entailed doing several approximations, and using each one to generate a more accurate curve. A couple of mathematicians called Runge and Kutta had developed a method of doing it in the early 20th century.

So I got hold of that, and added RK4 code into my simulation model. In tests, it looked fabulously accurate when I first tried it a couple of years ago. But somehow or other, when it came to the solar system, it was still pretty inaccurate. And I didn’t know why. I wondered if I’d have to increase the accuracy of my mathematics. Or use an even more detailed variant of RK4, like RK7 or RK10.

But in the last couple of months, I’ve begun to realise that the problem lay in the data I was using. The force acting on a body with mass M1 by another body with mass M2 is given by F = G. M1. M2 / r2, where G is the gravitational constant. It’s a constant you find in books. It’s given as 6.674×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2 in Wikipedia. But I gradually begun to realise that, wherever I looked, I’d find different values of it. For example today on one NASA website,  Planet Physical Parameters, they say that G=6.67428 ×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2. But on another page, Astrodynamic Constants, they say gravitational constant G = 6.67259 ×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2. And on a third page, Horizons, the implicit value of G is 6.673849813830591 ×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2. They’re all different. And it’s the same for the masses of the Sun and planets: they’re all different too!

And the result of using various different values of G and various different masses of the planets, was that they’d end up thousands of kilometres away from where they should have been. But today I finally managed to cut through the fog, and found in the Horizons website a set of numbers that worked.

And now, when my Earth goes 4 times around the Sun, it ends up just 36 km from where it’s supposed to be. That’s an error of less than 10 km per year, or 10 km in every thousand million km travelled.

It’s like a camera coming into sharp focus. Everything is almost crystal clear.

And that’s why I’m celebrating with a bottle of Strathisla. That’s why I’m delighted. It’s taken me 50 years, but I got there in the end.

View down Z axis onto Earth at time of Chelyabinsk fireball on 15 Feb 2013. B23 above the edge of the Earth is a sighting rock launched in 2009

View down Z axis onto Earth at time of Chelyabinsk fireball on 15 Feb 2013. B23 above the edge of the Earth is a sighting rock launched in 2009


Only 36 more km to go.


About Frank Davis

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38 Responses to Delighted

  1. Smoking Lamp says:

    Frank, Very cool! Enjoy your single malt!

  2. Scute says:

    Well done Frank! Enjoy the malt.

  3. Ken says:

    Did you ‘cubic spline’ to draw curves?

    • Frank Davis says:

      I don’t think so. I don’t actually draw true curves. I only draw straight lines. Every single line drawn in my simulation model is a straight line. That includes the RK4 approximation, where I find out the curvature of the line, but actually end up drawing a straight line between the end points. It’s also true of my map of the Earth, which entirely consists of straight lines between points. And my circles are really polygons

  4. nisakiman says:

    All a bit cerebral for me, Frank. But then I only got as far as ‘O’ levels before I left school, and maths and physics weren’t my strong subjects anyway. I find myself somewhat in awe of people who can juggle with complex equations like you do. I take my hat off to you for your achievement!

    I quite like a good malt whisky, but I’ve never come across Strathisla before – I had to Google it. I tend to gravitate towards the peaty malts from Islay.

    • Frank Davis says:

      Mathematics wasn’t a very strong subject of mine either. I can do some mathematics – geometry, for example -, but not others.

      Strathisla is a bit like Chivas Regal. Quite a rich taste. I think they both come from the same distillery.Leggy would know.

  5. Zaphod says:

    Very few people really understand the persistence and ingenuity involved in making something that finally, actually works. Especially when you do it for love, not wages.
    They make the right noises. But they assume that it was probably easy for you, because, “You’re good at that sort of thing, aren’t you?”
    It doesn’t matter though. The satisfaction is doing it.

    Just think, you could have spent all that time watching TV instead!

  6. Cecily Collingridge says:

    I remember slide rules. What an uplifting post. The fulfillment of childhood curiosity. I bask in your reflected satisfaction… it has set me up for the day nicely! Thank you.

  7. margo says:


  8. Barry Homan says:

    From me as well. Hats off to you, hard work always brings about a satisfying result.

  9. harleyrider1978 says:

    Since we all already have seen all the attempts by the WHO,the EU, the Obama administration and the UN trying to destroy and outlaw freespeech this brings hitlers playbook right back in on topic again with todays world. Its like the man lives yet again.

    Hitler and the Death of Free Speech

    Decent people can argue that the book is too dangerous to be published. But the fact is that Mein Kampf is too dangerous not to be published.

    The fact is that Mein Kampf is too dangerous not to be published.

    German authorities will allow the republication of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, after decades of censorship.

    Decent people can argue that the book is too dangerous to be published. But the fact is that Mein Kampf is too dangerous not to be published.

    The great fear is that Hitler’s ideas are not dead and that his book could trigger another horribly pathological social movement. Nationalism and socialism still appeal to many, and combinations of the two ideologies attract new adherents every day in Europe and around the world. (See The Far Left Brotherhood of Greek and German neo-Nazis.)

    Mein Kampf is already available in many editions, in many languages, and online. So the furor over its republication is about the Germans in particular: Can they handle it?

    One of many old jokes has one German ask another, “How many Poles does it take to change a light bulb?” The other German replies, “I don’t know. Let’s invade Poland and find out!”

    Always fun to poke at the Germans’ historical reputation. But it has been three generations since the end of World War II. There have been major cultural shifts in German attitudes towards militarism, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and other elements in the National Socialist package. There is plenty of evidence that today’s Germans are well above the average in civility and decency. So the post-Nazi cultural training wheels can come off.

    Yet beyond the specifics of the German debate, there is a more important general point about prohibiting even the most repulsive of ideas: Censorship weakens our ability to combat them.

    Levi Salomon, speaking for the Jewish Forum for Democracy and Against Anti-Semitism based in Berlin, opposes republication of Mein Kampf: “This book is outside of human logic.”

    Perhaps that is true, but it is not outside of human experience. We must understand the “logic” of national socialist beliefs, however dangerously wrong they turn out to be. Those beliefs continue to have a powerful psychological and social appeal to many, so it is crucial that every generation knows exactly what they are, why they attract many — and how to fight them.

    The Nazis were not just some crazy guys who somehow lucked into power. For too long a cartoonish understanding of National Socialism has held sway in the public mind.

    But consider this: For years before the Nazis took over, three Nobel-Prize winners — Johannes Stark, Gerhart Hauptmann, and Philipp Lenard — supported the Nazis.

    Also before the Nazis came to power, many intellectuals with Ph.D. degrees from the best German universities wrote books supporting national socialist ideology. Among them were the historian Dr. Oswald Spengler, who published the bestselling The Decline of the West in 1918. Spengler was the most famous German intellectual in the 1920s. The legal theorist Dr. Carl Schmitt wrote books that are still recognized as twentieth-century classics. Political theorist Moeller van den Bruck published The Third Reich in 1923, which was a big seller throughout the 1920s. And the philosopher Dr. Martin Heidegger, thought by many to be the most original philosophical mind of the century, actively supported the Nazis in theory and in practice.

    Many of those big-brained supporters of national socialism were extremely well read and saw themselves as disciples of George Hegel, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche — and as doing the vital, idealistic work of applying those abstract philosophies to practical politics. (See my Nietzsche and the Nazis for details.)

    So the problem is not Adolf Hitler alone. And if we are to censor dangerous writings that led to Nazism, the list is long.

    Also important is the fact that many millions of Germans voted for the Nazi party. In the critical democratic election of 1933, the Nazis won 43% of the vote — more than the next three parties combined. (In second place were the Socialists, and in third place were the Communists, which also speaks much about the political-intellectual climate of the time.)

    The electoral success of the Nazis was also not the product of a set of ideas in books alone. In building their movement, the Nazis used cutting-edge principles of marketing, logistics, and administration. They applied new theories of psychology and sociology to build upon a core movement of hundreds of devoted activists and turned it into a mass movement of millions of followers. Yet we don’t want to censor books on effective logistics, marketing, and social psychology.

    So we have some hard questions: Why did so many top intellectuals agree with National Socialist ideas? Why did so many volunteers and donors and professionals devote their energies to creating an awesomely awful political movement? Why did millions of German citizens vote — often enthusiastically — for the Nazis? Were they all just stupid/depraved/insane?

    No, they were not. Whether we like the fact or not, National Socialism embodies a deep philosophy of life — and that is what explains its power. One might argue that Nazi philosophy is not logical and rational. I will agree. Yet few philosophies are. One might argue that Nazism, if embraced fully, leads to psychosis. I will agree again. Yet that also is true of many philosophies.

    Suppressing dangerous ideas is much more dangerous than fighting them openly.

    But it’s neither logical nor rational nor sane to ignore a set of ideas that continues to animate movements around the world. Suppressing dangerous ideas is much more dangerous than fighting them openly.

    A free society can work only if most of its members understand what principles a free society depends upon and why they are better than the alternatives. That presupposes that they know what the alternatives are.

    So there are no short cuts in our ongoing cultural education. Every generation must discuss and debate the great ideas — true and false, known and possible, healthy and dangerous – and become intellectually armed so as to defend and advance liberal civilization.

    Sometimes the urge to censor focuses on the symbolism of allowing evil books to be published. Not censoring Mein Kampf, for example, is a statement by the authorities that they consider national socialist ideas to be within the range of acceptable opinion.

    But we should remember that a free society rejects the idea that it is up to the authorities to decide what opinions are acceptable. That’s our job, each of us individually.

    In his dissenting opinion in a classic case in American censorship, Justice Potter Stewart made this perceptive remark: “Censorship reflects a society’s lack of confidence in itself.”

    Much more here:

  10. harleyrider1978 says:

    Sound familiar in the Tobacco control playbook of denormalization:

    They applied new theories of psychology and sociology to build upon a core movement of hundreds of devoted activists and turned it into a mass movement of millions of followers. Yet we don’t want to censor books on effective logistics, marketing, and social psychology

    • harleyrider1978 says:


      “If you tell a lie big enough and keep
      repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be
      maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from
      the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus
      becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to
      repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus
      by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.”

      If only there were more people capable of independent thought, and took the trouble to do a little research, not to mention the profit geared up medical corporate that hide behind this ‘smokescreen.’

      • harleyrider1978 says:

        I think it was parmenion who showed us the Nazis had a media playbook every newspaper and radio station had to follow before any story was published or told via media……….

        • harleyrider1978 says:

          German Propaganda Archive Calvin College

          Background: The Nazis had a large corps of propagandists at the local level, who needed training. Some of the best material for such propagandists comes from the Austrian part of the Reich, perhaps because propagandists there needed to be trained rather quickly after Hitler took over Austria in 1938. In any event, this is a translation of a small book published in 1942 that told propagandists what they needed to know. It was intended primarily for local group propaganda leaders, but notes that it will also be useful for anyone engaged in making party propaganda. It provides a detailed summary of what the Nazi propaganda system expected to happen at the local level, though as this book sometimes notes in passing, things did not always work as they were supposed to.

          As background, the Reichspropagandaleitung was the Nazi Party’s central propaganda office. The country was then divided into Gaue, or regions. They were divided into counties (Kreise), which were further divided into local groups (Ortsgruppen). There were propagandists at each level.

          The source: Franz J. Huber, ed., Propagandisten-Fibel. Herausgegeben vom Gaupropagandaamt Oberdonau der NSDAP (Wels: Leitner & Co, 1942).

  11. harleyrider1978 says:

    Todays worldwide anti-tobacco movement is nothing more than a carbon copy of hitlers own anti-tobacco programs almost to the letter.

    But hitler wasnt the first to use propaganda and eugenics ideologies, they were mainstream ideas coming from California the same as todays own anti everything agendas. They are pumped by the pharma cororations and demcorats along with rinos thru the UN and the WHO world health organizations FCTC treaty where countries were forced to sign on or lose world bank and IMF loans for their countries. FCTC is the world anti tobacco treaty.

    Speaking of CENSORSHIP try this part out from the FCTC treaty:

    FCTC GAG ORDERS TO KEEP THE PEOPLE QUIET and have no debate the same as banning commenters…………

    fctc gag order guidelines

    11. The broad array of strategies and tactics used
    by the tobacco industry to interfere with
    the setting and implementing of tobacco control mea
    sures, such as those that Parties to the
    Convention are required to implement, is documented
    by a vast body of evidence. The
    measures recommended in these guidelines aim at pro
    tecting against interference not only by
    the tobacco industry but also, as appropriate, by o
    rganizations and individuals that work to
    further the interests of the tobacco industry.
    12. While the measures recommended in these guideli
    nes should be applied by Parties as
    broadly as necessary, in order best to achieve the
    objectives of Article 5.3 of the Convention,
    Parties are strongly urged to implement measures be
    yond those recommended in these
    guidelines when adapting them to their specific cir

    Its as if Hitler never died or at least his ideologies and their means of being forced thru,though they use the power of the purse and now the power of criminal law just for smoking a lousy cigarette or having one beer driving home from work………..lets not forget the fat folks……..or the soda pop drinkers or meat eaters or well just name it they will have a framework convention treaty summit on something you enjoy next or maybe just for existing like being a JEW or a Christian as they fill every country of Europe and states in America with moslems.

    • harleyrider1978 says:

      The WHO Attempts To Censor Websites

      As well as being entirely unelected, it appears that the World Health Organisation also doesn’t care much for openness and transparency.

      Rumours have reached Puddlecote Towers that the WHO is spitting blood about a leaked document from a November 2013 meeting being widely discussed, and is busily putting the frighteners on those who are discussing it. They are not happy with minutes which mention that the WHO views e-cigarettes as a threat – and which prompted a much-reported recent letter to the WHO by over 50 health professionals – reaching the internet, so are doing their best to make the document disappear.

      It was leaked to the Financial Times in April and has been quoted on a number of sites including Clive Bates’s blog a few days later. Now, however, I understand the WHO are issuing legal letters demanding the minutes be removed and ordering the site owners not to make any reference to the minutes or to quote from them.

      In case you’re curious, this is the document in question, with paragraphs 11, 23 and 69-75 the parts that the WHO would prefer you didn’t know about until they pursue classifying e-cigs as tobacco products in Moscow in November.

      WHO Leaked Document about E-Cigs

  12. harleyrider1978 says:


    This little booklet brings together the most important tasks of the propagandist. It is primarily intended to guide the activity of the Ortsgruppenpropagandaleiter of the NSDAP [local group propaganda leader], but with appropriate allowances it is also useful for the work of all other propagandists of the movement, no matter what position they may hold in the party’s divisions or affiliated organizations. Their task is to thoroughly present the entire German people with the National Socialist worldview, and to explain to it the achievements of the leadership of the party and state. The tremendous significance of this task has been proved by the war, in which the work of propagandists is critical for general morale and thereby for the spiritual powers of resistance of the German people. Obviously, effective propaganda is possibly only when it is unified. Only unified slogans spread by a tightly organized organization explain the power of National Socialism’s ideas during the struggle for power, which won over millions of the German people until first the majority, then the entire population, supported Adolf Hitler. The tested methods of propaganda and all the related areas that influence general morale and make it possible to lead people were, therefore, maintained after the takeover of power.

    The whole propaganda of the NSDAP and its divisions and affiliated organizations, is in the hands of the Reichspropagandaleiter [Goebbels]. He determines their propaganda activities. The most important areas relevant to this task are “active propaganda,” culture, film, radio, and finally cooperation with all divisions, clubs, and other relevant organizations, which are organized into the so-called Reich Ring (Gauring, Kreisring, Ortsring). There are also other particular areas, such as press propaganda, which must maintain contact with the NSDAP press apparatus, the Reich Federation for Damage Prevention, and other groups that in most cases function only at the Reich or Gau level.

    This system corresponds to the various areas of the movement’s propagandists, who are in direct contact with the population, in particular the local group propaganda leader of the NSDAP. His subordinates include the heads of various departments — although they often exist only on paper, given personnel shortages — and he is responsible for the overall conduct of propaganda within his area. The entire propaganda of the NSDAP, its divisions and affiliated organizations, is under his authority. He is also responsible for the propaganda work of all other offices within his area, and is responsible for ensuring their unified cooperation. The local propaganda ring assists him in this task.

    The Organisationsbuch der NSDAP [the party organization handbook] provides little information on the ways and means with which the propaganda leader is to carry out his responsibilities. Ordinarily, he will receive detailed guidelines from above for particular campaigns. However, in the future, as in the past during the domestic struggle, the first rule for each propagandist will be to use his own initiative. The propagandist in the local group is the one nearest to the people. He has the most direct contact with the manifold changes in the moods and attitudes of the various circles within the population. He sees with his own eyes and hears with his own ears what party members and citizens think of actions by the leadership of the party and state. He knows the personal influence he has and can constantly check the impact he is having and find better ways to carry out his duties.

    We now turn to the most important tasks of the local group propaganda leader. We will not provide dry and barren rules, but rather lively and understandable answers to the questions the propagandist faces in his daily work.

    The local group propaganda leader as active propagandist

    Other areas of propaganda, for example film, radio, etc., are rather precisely defined by their nature. The area of “active propaganda” is essentially unbounded. In general, one cannot exhaust the scope of propaganda in a barren plan. That is even less possible with active propaganda. It includes all methods of influencing the population, in as far as they are not covered by particular areas like the press, radio, etc. Your most important method of propaganda is probably the spoken word in mass meetings, meetings, cell evenings, and not least, face-to-face propaganda. However, “active propaganda” also works with pictures, with the written word in any form that seems useful, with posters, leaflets, showcases, etc. The following points give an overview of the most important parts of the varied work of an active propagandist in the local group, which will probably fall into the personal responsibility of the local group propaganda leader just about everywhere.

    1. Showcases

    Each local group has showcases and bulletin boards for the NSDAP, its divisions and affiliated organizations, and of other clubs and bodies. These showcases are a mirror of the local group. If all the showcases are in order, one can be almost certain that the overall state of the local group is good. The local group propaganda leader is not responsible only for the party’s showcases, but also for those of all other offices. He must ensure that they look good, are up-to-date, and are consistent with National Socialist thinking. Only a good and constantly updated showcase fulfills its task. A bad showcase not only does no good, but is harmful. The local group propaganda leader should note bad showcases, or those of divisions, organizations and clubs that are not maintained at all. If several warnings do not result in improvements, he should either use them for another purpose or have them removed altogether.

    All showcases and announcement boards that belong to the NSDAP are under the direct supervision of the Ortsgruppenleiter, and must be exemplary. Fresh material is regularly available for this purpose:

    The “Picture of the Week” consists of four current pictures with a common theme. Each local group gets it weekly.

    Each local group subscribes to the “Slogan of the Week.” It can either be posted as a whole or put in a showcase, appropriately cut into sections.

    The “Quotation of the Week” provides a quotation from a leading German in elegant form. It provides a good focus for a showcase, and can be supplemented with pictures.

    Periodically, particularly for national occasions, local groups receive material from the showcase service of the Reichspropandaleitung or the Gau propaganda office, which naturally should be the center of showcases.

    Beyond that, each enterprising propagandist can find his own material in the daily press and illustrated magazines to use in showcases, providing a personal note as well as variety. The local group itself usually subscribes to a useful major newspaper or illustrated magazine.

    The material used in showcases must be used in an attractive way. Random clippings and pictures may not be posted in a jumble, but rather everything must be organized and should have a clear theme. Less is usually better than more in this regard. It is best to have two or three items with a suitable background and appropriate text.

    If one lacks the necessary talent in drawing and handwriting, he must get an assistant, who can usually be found without much difficulty in the ranks of the Hitler Youth.

    • harleyrider1978 says:

      Matching models of TC propaganda with Nazi propaganda

      Editors’ Introduction
      Through the SmokeLess States® Program, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has supported the work of state tobacco-control coalitions across the nation. The program ranks among the largest investments ever made by the Foundation, with $99 million authorized since 1992—more than a ?fth of the Foundation’s $420 million portfolio of grants designed to reduce tobacco use in the United States.
      In this chapter, Karen Gerlach and Michelle Larkin, the two program of?cers currently responsible for overseeing the SmokeLess States Program, chronicle its development, implementation, and impact. Two features about the program stand out. First, the Foundation encouraged its grantees (state tobacco-control coalitions) to be activists—to try to bring about social change rather than doing research to ?nd out how social change can be brought about. Second, and following from the ?rst, the Foundation unabashedly emphasized advocacy to bring about policy change. The authors trace the program’s evolution from one with both educational and advocacy elements to one focused exclusively on advocacy. This meant that the Foundation had to be especially careful that its funds not be used for lobbying. It provided training to grantees and monitored the program vigilantly to be sure that federal laws prohibiting the use of Foundation funds for lobbying were scrupulously followed.
      The SmokeLess States program relied on an approach to social change traditionally taken by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation—the support of coalitions.1 Thus, in addition to its insights on the role of advocacy, this chapter offers a window into the role of coalitions in bringing about social change.
      The chapter complements the one by James Bornemeier in this year’s Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology that reviews the Foundation’s investments to reduce the harm caused by tobacco.2
      1. See, for example, Wielawski, I. “The Fighting Back Program.” To Improve Health and Health Care, Vol. VII: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004; and Jellinek, P., and Schapiro, R. “Join Together and CADCA: Backing Up the Front Line.” To Improve Health and Health Care, Vol. VII: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004.
      2. Chapter One in this volume.
      Chapter Two, excerpted from The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology: To Improve Health and Health Care Volume VIII
      Edited by Stephen L. Isaacs and James R. Knickman Published 11/2005

      Prior to the early 1990s, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation had not addressed the threat that tobacco use posed to life and health in the United States. Most of the Foundation’s grantmaking had focused on improving the delivery of health care services. Those limited investments that had been made to improve health were largely directed toward preventing the use of illicit drugs.1
      When Steven Schroeder became the third president of The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in 1990, he arrived with the understanding that the Foundation could not help to improve the health of all Americans unless it addressed the harm caused by tobacco. Even before taking of?ce, Schroeder had made clear to the Foundation’s Board of Trustees his desire to make tobacco a signi?cant new area of the Foundation’s grantmaking.2 At the time, tobacco use caused 400,000 deaths a year.
      In 1992, the Trustees authorized the development of programs that would curb the use of tobacco, especially among young people for whom smoking was illegal.3 Schroeder designated Nancy Kaufman, a public health professional from Wisconsin, who had recently joined the Foundation as a vice president, to design the Foundation’s tobacco-control programs, and Kaufman in turn asked Michael Beachler, who was a program of?cer with experience in health policy, to assist her. They worked under the umbrella of a Foundation group headed by Robert Hughes that was developing programs to curb substance abuse, including tobacco.
      As one of its initial investments, the Foundation funded the Tobacco Policy Research and Evaluation Program, which supported research to examine policies that might have an impact on tobacco use— such as research demonstrating the link between cigarette excise taxes and reduced smoking rates.4 Understanding the policies that might affect tobacco use was an essential ?rst step. Translating that evidence into practice was an important second step. Kaufman asked Beachler to determine how best to do this, and suggested that he familiarize himself with work going on in California—at that time the only state that had allocated substantial resources to tobacco control. Following the passage of its Proposition 99 in 1988, which imposed a tax on tobacco products and dedicated the revenue to addressing tobacco use, California designed and adopted a comprehensive program to reduce smoking throughout the state. The program included countermarketing, cessation services, research, and prevention efforts. After spending time in California and observing how the state was spending its tobacco tax funds, Beachler concluded that the California experiment was tailor-made for a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation demonstration program in which a variety of approaches could be tried in different states.
      To be sure that a new demonstration program would not duplicate other programs, especially the National Cancer Institute’s American Stop Smoking Intervention Study, or ASSIST, Beachler attended a meeting of ASSIST grantees. He found that ASSIST, which supported tobacco-control partnerships in seventeen states, appeared to be reducing tobacco use, and also that the states had only limited resources to pay for efforts to reduce tobacco use. Beachler also met with staff members
      2 The SmokeLess States Program
      The SmokeLess States Program Takes Shape
      from the Of?ce on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC, to learn about its new investments in tobacco-control efforts in states that were not part of ASSIST. From these meetings, he learned that grantees at state health departments often found it dif?cult to get the attention of their governor, whose support was crucial to their success.
      After reviewing their research and interviews, Foundation staff members concluded that a privatesector voice was needed to complement government-funded programs. They felt that The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation could most effectively translate policy research into policy change by awarding grants to coalitions of nongovernmental organizations that would educate the public and policy-makers about the tobacco problem and potential ways to address it. Thus the concept of the SmokeLess States program was born.
      One of the ?rst issues to be faced by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation staff was the extent to which the Foundation should be involved in advocacy—that is, advocating for tobacco-control policies. While the Foundation had supported research on policy for many years, it had not worked to bring about changes in policy. Such work would involve taking a step that worried some members of the staff and the Board, so the program’s emphasis on policy advocacy was not given prominence, even though it was an important component from the beginning.
      A second, related issue was that of lobbying. In state capitals across the country, the tobacco industry lobbied, and it lobbied hard. Lobbying by tobacco-control advocates would have to be done to counteract the actions of the tobacco industry. But federal law prohibits private foundations from lobbying, and grantees cannot legally use Foundation funds for that purpose. Legally, the Foundation’s grantees were allowed to use their own resources and matching funds raised privately to lobby. Federal regulations permit foundations to support projects that include lobbying, so long as they support only the nonlobbying portion of the project. Thus, the Foundation’s conditions of grant expressly prohibited Foundation funds from being used for lobbying.
      A third issue was the selection of a National Program Of?ce, or NPO. As the organization that would directly oversee the administration of the grants and provide technical assistance to the grantees, the NPO would play a key role in the program. The NPO had to be a large organization that was on the side of tobacco control, that commanded the respect of the Board and the staff alike, that possessed the administrative ability to manage a large program and the wherewithal to provide technical support to sites around the country, and that had the clout to go toe-to-toe with the tobacco industry, if necessary. The staff determined that the American Medical Association, or AMA, had many of these attributes and that it would be the most appropriate place to house the new SmokeLess States program. The AMA was offered the chance to become the NPO, and it accepted the offer.
      In April 1993, the Foundation’s staff presented the new program, called SmokeLess States: Statewide Tobacco Prevention and Control, to the Board of Trustees. The Board authorized the program for $10 million over four years. Thomas Houston, a physician who had worked for Doctors Ought to Care, an advocacy organization that engaged physicians in the ?ght against tobacco, and then had become the director of the AMA’s Department of Preventive Medicine and Environmental Health,
      3 The SmokeLess States Program
      became the National Program director. As his deputy director he recruited Kathleen Harty, who had spent many years with the Department of Health in Minnesota working on tobacco control. Together, Houston and Harty worked with Foundation staff members to give ?nal shape to the program and to guide its ?rst group of grantee states.
      The Foundation established three overall objectives for the SmokeLess States program: (1) reducing the number of children and young people who start using tobacco; (2) reducing the number of people who continue using tobacco; and (3) increasing the public’s awareness that reducing tobacco use is an important component of any major effort at health care reform. To accomplish these goals, it sought applications from statewide coalitions made up of organizations such as the health voluntaries (the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association), state medical societies, hospital associations, and others. The coalitions were to conduct public education campaigns, strengthen prevention and treatment capacity, and advocate for tobacco-control policies. To encourage collaboration among the various organizations working on tobacco control within a state, the Foundation allowed only one coalition per state to apply.
      Recognizing that state coalitions were in various stages of readiness to take on this work, the Foundation offered two types of grants under the program: a two-year capacity-building grant and a four-year implementation grant. The Foundation staff expected to award ten capacity-building grants averaging $200,000 and eight implementation grants, ranging from $500,000 to $1.2 million each.
      To help the Foundation and the NPO staff assess and select grantees, a National Advisory Committee was created. Joseph Califano, the former secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, served as its ?rst chairman. With the guidance of the National Advisory Committee and the NPO, the Foundation selected nineteen state coalitions for funding: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, Vermont, and West Virginia, each of which was awarded an implementation grant, and Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington, which received capacity-building grants. Most of the coalitions were housed in one of the three major health voluntaries; two were housed in their state’s medical society.
      These coalitions, which began their SmokeLess States grants in 1994, addressed tobacco use in different ways. Some focused on educating the public, others on involving young people, still others on public policy; many coalitions worked on a combination of approaches simultaneously. Alaska’s coalition, for example, capitalized on the Iditarod dogsled race, working in partnership with event organizers and sponsoring a dogsled musher to educate Alaskans about the harms of tobacco use. New Jersey’s coalition concentrated on increasing public support for raising tobacco excise taxes. It used its grant resources to educate the public about tobacco-related harm and the positive impact that higher tobacco taxes have on deterring youth use.
      As the coalitions matured, it became clear that they needed assistance understanding the difference between advocacy and public education, which they were legally permitted to do with Foundation
      4 The SmokeLess States Program
      The SmokeLess States Program and Its Early Challenges
      funds, and lobbying, which they were not. To make sure that grantees did not violate the prohibition on lobbying with Foundation funds, the Foundation and the NPO provided training and guidance on the difference. In general, direct lobbying involves communications to a legislator re?ecting a view on speci?c legislation while grassroots lobbying involves a communication with the members of the general public that encourages them to take action on speci?c legislation. Neither type of lobbying can be done using Foundation funds. Advocacy, that is, educating policy-makers and the community generally about issues and the measures that can be taken to address them, is not lobbying.
      Since the difference is not always crystal clear, the charge of lobbying can be used as a threat by those who oppose what a foundation and its grantees are doing. A case in point occurred in Colorado. The grantee in that state, the Coalition for Tobacco-Free Colorado, was interested in conducting a media campaign to educate the public about the bene?ts of increasing the price of tobacco as a way to reduce smoking. (A tobacco tax increase was to appear on the November 1994 ballot.) Shortly after an invitation to bid on the contract for the media campaign was sent to various ?rms, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation received a letter from Covington & Burling, a wellknown Washington, D.C., law ?rm that represented tobacco companies. This letter, addressed to the Foundation’s proposal manager, Ed Robbins, suggested that the Foundation’s support for the Colorado coalition crossed the line into activities that were prohibited under the Internal Revenue Code. The letter stated in part:
      Given the sponsors, the context and the timing of the proposed media campaign, there is at the very least a substantial risk that the campaign will fail to qualify as an “educational” activity, or as “nonpartisan analysis, study, or research,” within the meaning of the relevant statutes and Treasury regulations. This, obviously, could have adverse tax consequences for the foundation. More to the point, our clients and we would strenuously object to any use of private foundation funds to support what can fairly be viewed here as a lobbying effort, either expressed or implied. This would adversely affect the interests of our clients, and it would also be contrary to the public policies re?ected in the Internal Revenue Code restrictions on the use of tax-deductible funds for legislative activity.
      After consulting with Sidney Wentz, the chairman of the Board of Trustees who was himself an attorney, and J. Warren Wood, the Foundation’s general counsel, Robbins responded with a brief assurance that the Foundation’s funds were being used in accordance with the law. In December 1994, another letter, addressed this time to Wentz, was sent to the Foundation from a congressman representing a tobacco-producing state. The congressman appended to his letter copies of his correspondence with the Internal Revenue Service questioning the Foundation’s tax-exempt status and requesting that the IRS investigate the Foundation’s use of resources, particularly its tobacco-control investments. Wentz answered the letter, explaining that the Foundation prohibited the use of its funds for lobbying. No Internal Revenue Service action was forthcoming.
      During the ?rst few years of the SmokeLess States program, the nineteen state coalitions were, by and large, able to develop and maintain coalitions dedicated to reducing smoking and, in the process, to professionalize the tobacco-prevention movement. In the ?rst year of the program (1994–1995), four states—all of which had coalitions funded under the SmokeLess States program—
      5 The SmokeLess States Program
      The Evolution of the SmokeLess States Program
      raised their excise taxes on cigarettes. Although each of these coalitions was engaged in an educational campaign about the impact of tobacco taxes on smoking rates, it is unclear, given the short time that they had been Foundation grantees, what role their Foundation support played in the policy gains.
      These changes, plus the reductions in youth smoking that were being reported out of California, demonstrated to other states in the program that policy change was possible and that it could be advanced by using a combination of Foundation funds and unrestricted resources. The approach of disseminating scienti?cally rigorous research on policy (some of which was supported by the Tobacco Policy Research and Evaluation Program) to a general audience demonstrated that policy change was possible and that it could be effective in reducing tobacco use.
      In 1996, the staff reviewed the SmokeLess States program and determined that it was continuing to ful?ll an important need in the ?eld by focusing attention on changing policies to reduce tobacco use. Before taking the program forward for a renewal, the staff assessed tobacco-control activities occurring throughout the country. For the tobacco-control ?eld, it was an exciting time. On the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, announced that it would regulate advertising and marketing of tobacco products to young people. It also asserted that it had the authority to regulate nicotine as a drug and cigarettes as the delivery device. The ASSIST program still had two years of funding remaining, though it appeared unlikely that it would be renewed. Finally, the CDC was increasing its support for state health departments to work on tobacco prevention and treatment. The activities of the SmokeLess States coalitions complemented these efforts and, in many instances, enabled the state health departments to go beyond the traditional public health education approach and to reach a broader segment of the state’s population.
      Increasing federal interest and investment in tobacco-control efforts, rising youth smoking rates, and the SmokeLess States grantees’ initial ability to develop functioning coalitions, creative educational campaigns, and increasingly sophisticated policy advocacy prompted the Foundation staff to request a $20 million expansion of the program. In April 1996, the Board approved a second round of grants, increasing the number of state coalitions to thirty over a four-year period. There were some differences between this round and the ?rst round. First, while grantees were funded to strengthen statewide coalitions, to foster public awareness efforts to denormalize tobacco use, and to enhance tobacco prevention and treatment capacity, the Call for Proposals speci?cally asked applicants to address tobacco policy issues in their state. This change signi?ed that the Foundation’s comfort level with advocacy work had increased, and that its overall approach to policy work was maturing. Second, all of the grants awarded under this round—which ranged from $200,000 to $1.5 million— were implementation grants. Finally, and perhaps most signi?cantly, the program incorporated a “special opportunities fund,” with $3 million held in reserve for those times when coalitions needed additional support to respond to unforeseen opportunities. This fund, which was administered by the AMA, allowed for a quicker response than would have been possible at the Foundation.
      6 The SmokeLess States Program
      Program Renewals: Focusing on Tobacco Policy
      The next year, 1997, was a turbulent one for tobacco control. The National Cancer Institute announced that the ASSIST program would close in 1999, and that responsibility for funding state tobacco control efforts would be assumed by the CDC. Smoking rates were declining slightly among adults, but remained high among young people. The science of tobacco control was improving the understanding of the problem and its solutions, but it was also making clear that it would be a long time before signi?cant reductions in tobacco-related disease and death occurred. State attorneys general were bringing lawsuits against the tobacco industry requesting damages for the huge costs states incurred to treat sick smokers. At The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Michael Beachler, the primary architect of the SmokeLess States program, left the Foundation. Early in 1998 (a year that also saw the signing of the $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement between forty-six states and the tobacco industry), Karen Gerlach, an epidemiologist, became the Foundation’s of?cer responsible for overseeing the program.
      With all this turmoil in tobacco control and a new program of?cer overseeing SmokeLess States, a decision was made to buy some time in order to assess how best to move forward. In order to do that without losing some states whose funding would be ending soon, in July 1998, the Foundation’s Board authorized $6 million to continue support for the original nine implementation states. Several months later, Kathleen Harty left as the deputy director of the NPO in order to lead the Minnesota foundation created as a result of the state’s settlement with the tobacco industry. She was replaced by Donna Grande, who brought years of experience at the national level with ASSIST and at the state level with Arizona’s SmokeLess States project. (Grande was named codirector of the National Program in 2000.)
      In late 1999, Michelle Larkin joined the Foundation from the CDC’s Of?ce on Smoking and Health. She worked with other Foundation staff members to conduct a wide-ranging review of SmokeLess States. Foundation staff members spent much of the year talking to the program’s national partners (the federal government, the major health voluntary organizations, and other organizations working on tobacco control) and assessing the makeup of the National Program Of?ce and the National Advisory Committee. This review led to a request for what became the program’s ?nal renewal, in July 2000. The Board authorized $52 million over three years to expand SmokeLess States to all ?fty states and the District of Columbia, with a major shift in the direction of the program. The program would now focus solely on advocacy regarding tobacco policy. To highlight the signi?cance of the shift, the tag line of the name was changed from “Statewide Tobacco Prevention and Control” to “National Tobacco Policy Initiative,” the National Advisory Committee was restructured, and a new logo was designed.
      In this, the ?nal phase of the program, the Foundation required states to concentrate exclusively on advancing policies that would reduce tobacco use. These included increased prices (through excise taxes, for example), comprehensive clean indoor air policies, and expanded public and private insurance coverage of tobacco dependence treatment. Coalitions funded under previous rounds of the SmokeLess States program could apply for implementation grants of up to $1.5 million over three years. States that were not funded previously under the SmokeLess States program could apply for a capacity-building grant, which allowed them time to develop the coalition and its policy action plan.
      7 The SmokeLess States Program
      If their capacity-building benchmarks, such as diversifying the coalition’s membership, securing matching dollars, and developing a clear and achievable policy action plan, were met, the coalition could then apply for an implementation grant.
      In their proposals for an implementation grant, applicants needed to demonstrate an understanding of the policy environment within the state, to provide details of other efforts in the state to reduce tobacco use, and to explain how the Foundation’s support would complement those efforts. They had to present a policy plan and show that ?nancial resources from other organizations, including unrestricted funds that could be used for lobbying, would be available. They were also required to address how they would carry out program activities while complying with the Foundation’s terms of grant. To build a stronger base of support for the policy efforts that would become the focus of the grant, applicants were required to diversify their coalitions beyond the mainstream organizations, particularly the health voluntaries and the medical societies that had been the mainstays of the program in previous years. The Foundation and NPO staffs believed that broader membership would better re?ect the makeup of society as a whole and would allow new organizations to bring their perspectives and their power bases to the issue.
      With the new policy focus of SmokeLess States, it became necessary to revisit the membership of the National Advisory Committee, or NAC, which was changed to bring in representatives of new organizations that would be essential partners in getting work done in the states. In addition to representatives from the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association, the Foundation added to the committee representatives from the federal government’s National Institutes of Health and CDC, the American Legacy Foundation, the Tobacco-Control Section of the California Department of Health Services, the Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, and the Asian Paci?c Partners for Empowerment and Leadership. Four of the original National Advisory Committee members were also included in the new committee.
      Additionally, the role of the NAC changed. In addition to their primary responsibility for reviewing proposals and recommending sites for funding, the committee’s members took on additional duties: reviewing benchmarks proposed by the coalitions, conducting site visits with the NPO and Foundation staff members, and providing technical assistance to grantees.
      The Foundation received proposals from all ?fty states and the District of Columbia, and awarded grants to forty-two states and the District. Some state coalitions, including many that had been grantees in the program for years, had dif?culty adapting to a policy-only approach to reducing tobacco use. Many tried hard to continue their past efforts that were more educational in nature, such as holding health fairs and distributing brochures on the harm caused by tobacco. In a few states, the department of health had grown to rely on the coalition to implement many of its programs and to garner public support for tobacco-prevention and cessation initiatives. While this remained an important role in the ?eld, it was no longer the objective of the Foundation-funded program. Moreover, the close connection between the coalitions and the state health departments complicated the coalitions’ ability to do policy-related work, since governmental agencies are prohibited from taking an active role in making policy.
      8 The SmokeLess States Program
      To assist the coalitions’ transformation from programmatic to policy activities, the NPO staff made site visits and provided technical assistance on developing policy action plans. Where intensive assistance was needed, the NPO staff made referrals to experts on particular issues, such as strategic planning, grassroots organizing, working with diverse populations, fundraising, and media relations. Despite the intensive technical assistance provided by the NPO, some coalitions were unable to make the transition to a policy focus, and did not meet their benchmarks. The more hands-on approach to technical assistance created some apprehension among the NPO staff and many of the states, especially those that had been in the program from the beginning. As a consequence, there was a high turnover of staff members at the NPO, resulting in a loss of continuity there and some loss of momentum in the states.
      Despite the challenges, the state coalitions supported in the last round of SmokeLess States achieved more than had been expected. Although the precise impact of the Foundation’s support cannot be determined, more than thirty states raised their cigarette excise taxes, some more than once. In addition, six states—Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island— as well as many cities and towns, enacted comprehensive clean indoor air laws that cover all workers, including those in restaurants and bars. The methods employed by the coalitions are illustrated by the examples of New York State and Oregon.
      n Over the years, the New York coalition had developed good relationships with policy-makers. When legislators were found to be interested in learning more about clean indoor air, the coalition took the opportunity to educate them through nonpartisan research and analysis on the health and economic bene?ts that California and other smoke-free places were experiencing. This evidence, coupled with results from opinion polls showing public support for clean indoor air, helped to spur action. The coalition knew that lobbying assistance would be needed, so it used matching dollars (that is, money not from The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) and hired some experienced lobbyists. A bill eliminating smoking in public places throughout the state was introduced and passed. n The coalition in Oregon had two primary goals: to expand Oregon’s smoke-free workplace law and to increase access to smoking-cessation services. It also had the secondary goal of building momentum for a cigarette tax increase. Because Oregon was experiencing substantial budget de?cits, the coalition felt that the time was right to pursue its secondary goal, so it focused its attention on increasing the tax on cigarettes. It conducted an extensive public education campaign. It also raised over $240,000 in non–Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funds to lobby legislators about the allocation of the tax dollars and to support the measure on the ballot. In September 2002, Oregonians approved a ballot measure raising the cigarette excise tax by sixty cents.
      In 2003, Risa Lavizzo-Mourey became the Foundation’s fourth president. She took over at a time when less money was available for programs and the Foundation was reconsidering its priorities. Through a process in which the Foundation developed a more focused grantmaking approach, tobacco was selected as one of eight areas that would continue to receive funds in the future. The amount of support would be, however, much less than it had been in the past, and in July 2003 it became clear that the SmokeLess States program would not be renewed. In August 2003, the Foundation noti?ed the AMA that the NPO would close in May 2004, although some grants under the program would continue beyond that date. Soon thereafter, this was made public in a letter
      9 The SmokeLess States Program
      co-signed by Lavizzo-Mourey and Michael Maves, the chief executive of?cer of the AMA. Many of the grantees reacted with great disappointment to the announcement and expressed concern for the future of tobacco-control advocacy in their states. Since the announcement, Foundation staff members have been working to determine the most strategic ways to maintain the policy infrastructure that had been supported by the SmokeLess States program. As of mid-2004, that future is still being planned.
      As the SmokeLess States program draws to a close, we, the program of?cers at The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation overseeing it, would like to offer some re?ections. The Foundation invested more than $99 million in SmokeLess States during the ten years the program was active. This represents over 20 percent of the $420 million the Foundation invested in tobacco control since 1992. These are remarkable resources and represent a long-term commitment for a private foundation. The magnitude of the problem of tobacco use, however, required large ?nancial and human resources over an extended period of time, and our concern is that even these resources might not have been suf?cient to make the gains permanent.
      Those of us at The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation who were responsible for the SmokeLess States program should have acted sooner and more aggressively in developing comprehensive approaches to sustaining the efforts of the states. The program relied heavily on the three major health voluntary organizations—the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association—to provide ?nancial support, particularly funds that could be used to support lobbying efforts the Foundation could not and did not support. In retrospect, we should have encouraged the coalitions to diversify their funding sources earlier so that the burden didn’t fall so heavily on these organizations. When an economic downturn hit in 2000–2001, their ability to support these efforts declined signi?cantly. We should also have helped the coalitions reach out to local funding sources. Although the NPO did provide guidance about fundraising to the coalitions in the ?nal years of the program, it may have been too late to keep some of the coalitions a?oat ?nancially.
      A second thought is that the efforts to diversify the coalitions were not as successful as we would have hoped. When the program was expanded in 2000, we expressly requested that states diversify their coalition membership. Yet even when diversi?cation became one of the benchmarks for progress, many states made only minimal efforts to expand. They explained that diversi?cation took too much time and too many resources, thus diminishing what was available to do the work of the coalition. We were naïve. We did not realize how dif?cult diversi?cation was going to be for most of the coalitions. We do not believe that most of them understood why we were adamant about diversi?cation—that the movement will not survive if it does not grow to represent the population of the state. Although the NPO made a heroic effort, and many states made signi?cant progress, there is still much work to be done to truly diversify the movement. We believe it is critical for this work to continue.
      A third thought is that clear benchmarks and the ability to measure progress are critical. Benchmarks allowed the NPO and the grantees to work together to make adjustments along the way. As important as it is to know if progress was being made, measuring coalitions’ performance against the benchmarks met with strong resistance, especially among those who had not been previously monitored in such a
      10 The SmokeLess States Program
      Concluding Thoughts
      manner. We believe that utilizing benchmarks and offering technical support to help coalitions meet them were well worth the effort, and improved the performance of the coalitions. In many instances, the coalitions were successful in meeting the benchmarks, but some were unable to meet them, and we had to make tough decisions about whether to continue supporting their efforts.
      A fourth observation is that advocacy, though not a strategy employed frequently by foundations, can be an effective way to improve the health of the public. Yet advocacy work is messy, and overseeing it is time-intensive. This kind of grantmaking requires astute legal assistance and strong leadership. Fortunately, SmokeLess States was able to bene?t from both. The program forged new ground at the Foundation, but, despite its success, there has been minimal uptake of advocacy as a tool in our grantmaking arsenal. Perhaps we should do more to interest other foundations in this approach to addressing important social issues.
      Finally, we learned how vital it is to recognize the contribution of grantees and their staffs. Each year of the program, an annual meeting of the coalitions was held in the state that had experienced the greatest policy victory in the previous year. Originally, the meeting was held in the state that increased its tobacco tax the most, but the ?nal annual meeting was held in Delaware to recognize the coalition and the state for enacting the most comprehensive clean indoor air law in the country. These events not only helped the grantees see one another on their home turf instead of at a conference center but they also allowed us to recognize the grantees for the hard work they had done. In hindsight, we should have celebrated their achievements more than just annually.
      Despite these challenges, we believe that the program was a success. It exceeded our policy advocacy expectations and provided important insights into how to do this work more effectively. Many of these coalitions continue to expand their membership, moving toward a more inclusive power base. Most of the SmokeLess States coalitions have expressed intentions to continue to work on tobaccopolicy advocacy post SmokeLess States and are engaged in securing resources to support this work.
      The demonstration program that was SmokeLess States ended in 2004. The AMA, the National Program Of?ce staff, and the grantees showed great commitment and dedication to this important work. The health of all Americans has been improved by their efforts. Time will tell what the lasting impact will be.
      1. Hughes, R. “Adopting the Substance Abuse Goal: A Story of Philanthropic Decision Making.” To Improve Health and Health Care 1998–1999: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999.
      2. Schapiro, R. “A Conversation with Steven A. Schroeder.” To Improve Health and Health Care, Vol. VI: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003.
      3. Chapter One in this volume.
      4. Gutman, M. A., Altman, D. G., and Rabin, R. L. “Tobacco Policy Research.” To Improve Health and Health Care 1998–1999: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999.
      11 The SmokeLess States Program
      Copyright © 2005 by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Route One and College Road East, Princeton, New Jersey 08543. Reprint permissions requests should be sent to Visit to learn more about our work.

      • harleyrider1978 says:

        [PDF]The SmokeLess States Program –

        by KK GERLACH – ‎Cited by 14 – ‎Related articles
        Through the SmokeLess States® Program, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has supported the work of state tobacco-control coalitions across the nation.

      • slugbop007 says:

        RWJ Foundation also provides many scholarships for budding, young health zealots. Like Bruce Baskerville and Ryan Kennedy of Propel, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Not to forget Gary Giovino and Sally Satel, among others. They are cranking out more disciples like them by the hundreds, perhaps thousands, every year. It only takes one year of study to receive a Master of Pubic Health Degree.

  13. harleyrider1978 says:

    The Anti-tobacco Campaign of the Nazis –

    Historians and epidemiologists have only recently begun to explore the Nazi anti-tobacco movement. Germany had the world’s strongest anti smoking …

    Today’s Anti-Smoking Purge Is Borrowed From The Nazis

    Apr 25, 2007 – The Nazis banned tobacco advertising and financed huge public … with the help of manufactured junk science on behalf of the medical and …

    • harleyrider1978 says:

      Today’s Anti-Smoking Purge Is Borrowed From The Nazis
      Smoking is healthier than fascism

      Paul Joseph Watson
      Prison Planet
      Wednesday, April 25, 2007

      A wealth of overlooked yet frightening literature concerning the Nazi crusade against smoking provides a clear parallel to contemporary developments and an alarming warning that state restriction of personal habits is the pre-cursor to dictatorship.

      Beginning in the early 1930’s, as part of the Nazi agenda for racial purity, Hitler spearheaded a national campaign to ban smoking in all public buildings, and denounced the practice as a betrayal of the fascist drive for bodily purity.

      “Brother national socialist, do you know that our Führer is against smoking and think that every German is responsible to the whole people for all his deeds and emissions, and does not have the right to damage his body with drugs?” stated one magazine.

      As I wrote earlier this year, “The regulation of the personal habit of smoking, including new legislative moves in San Francisco to ban cigarettes in private homes, and its enforcement by an eager cadre of state snoops and snitches, represents nothing more than a move on behalf of big brother towards the complete subjugation and shackling of the individual.”

      Read these shocking parallels and compare them to the endless lecturing we are forced to endure today about our personal lifestyle choices by the state and their propaganda arm, the mass media.

      The Nazis banned tobacco advertising and financed huge public relations campaigns to propagandize people into giving up smoking.

      – The Nazis banned smoking in government offices, civic transport, university campuses, rest homes, post offices, many restaurants and bars, hospital grounds and workplaces, and Hitler gave awards to associates who quit the habit.

      – A ban on smoking in private vehicles was called for.

      – The Nazi Reich Health Office warned that smoking caused impotence and produced posters depicting smoking as a dirty habit of Jews, Gypsies, blacks, intellectuals and Indians.

      – Nazi lobbyists lectured terrified children in schools on the horrors of racial impurity as a result of smoking.

      – The term “passive smoking” (Passivrauchen) was coined by the Nazi Anti-Tobacco League. Its author, Fritz Lickint, offered no supporting evidence to claim that smokers poisoned everyone around them, while also stating that drinking coffee caused cancer.

      The Internet leader in activist media – Prison Thousands of special reports, videos, MP3’s, interviews, conferences, speeches, events, documentary films, books and more – all for just 15 cents a day! Click here to subscribe! Find out the true story behind government sponsored terror, 7/7, Gladio and 9/11, get Terror Storm!

      – Hitler was an ardent vegetarian and did not smoke or drink after the age of 30, even accrediting the rise of fascism to his success in kicking the habit. He forbade anyone from smoking in a room he might enter. Fellow fascist leaders Mussolini, Napoleon and Franco also detested smoking.

      – The Nazi anti-smoking crusade was unleashed with the help of manufactured junk science on behalf of the medical and health establishment, one such example being that smoking caused “spontaneous abortions” in pregnant women.

      – Hitler attempted to price out smoking for Germans, levying huge taxes on cigarettes.

      – Despite the Nazi propaganda crusade against smoking, tobacco sales increased in Germany, leading some history professors to hypothesize that smoking was an act of cultural resistance against fascism, until the late 1930’s after smoking was banned in most public buildings and tobacco sales rapidly declined.

      What conclusions can we draw from these parallels? Either the Nazis were benign really cared about everyone’s health or they used the specter of anti-smoking to exert massive control over people’s lives and scale back basic freedoms, getting a foot in the door for the political dictatorship that was to follow.

      Similarly today, either the same elite that advocate “mass culling” of the majority of the world’s population really do care about public health and well-being or they are using the excuse of the anti-smoking drive to condition us to accept state regulation over every aspect of our personal lives.

      It’s all about control, it’s all about letting you know who the bosses are. If the government can regulate personal habits and behavior, what’s next? If the state is so concerned about our good health as they would have you believe, why not use the latest scientific advancements to remove that nasty aggressive gene that causes so much unhappiness? Well, you’re causing those around you distress and harming their health so why not? Are your political opinions a mental illness? Are they harming society? Perhaps we should ban certain types of “free” speech that is offensive to others.

      You see where this is all heading – how long before our wall mounted personal x-ray body scanners are accompanied by special smoke detectors that inform on you to the local Stasi if you dare to light up?

      We live in a paranoid world overpopulated by ninnying jellyfish who dare not dip their toe in the water in case there’s a law against it, it might upset someone, or it might be bad for their health.

      Many people will read this article having lost loved ones as a result of smoking. Please don’t have a knee jerk emotional reaction, try to understand that the point I’m making – smoking is unhealthy but it is healthier than fascism and government regulation of personal habits leads to dictatorship.

      The fact that the very language and policies that we are now bombarded with as a justification for state regulation of our personal lifestyle choices are directly lifted from Nazi policies for racial hygiene from the 1930’s should alarm us all and act as a wake up call to the true agenda behind today’s anti-smoking purge.

  14. garyk30 says:


    Such perseverance is to be admired.

    Accuracy rate of 0.99999999 will be difficult to improve upon. :)

  15. harleyrider1978 says:

  16. harleyrider1978 says:

  17. beobrigitte says:

    Congrats, Frank! Hope you enjoyed your Strathisla! (I still favour the 18 year old Glenfiddich!)

    I’m just curious: (not qualified in the field, so my question may be a bit of a bummer)
    The force acting on a body with mass M1 by another body with mass M2 is given by F = G. M1. M2 / r2, where G is the gravitational constant. It’s a constant you find in books. It’s given as 6.674×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2 in Wikipedia. But I gradually begun to realise that, wherever I looked, I’d find different values of it. For example today on one NASA website, Planet Physical Parameters, they say that G=6.67428 ×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2. But on another page, Astrodynamic Constants, they say gravitational constant G = 6.67259 ×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2. And on a third page, Horizons, the implicit value of G is 6.673849813830591 ×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2. They’re all different. And it’s the same for the masses of the Sun and planets: they’re all different too!
    garyk30 has posted an interesting reply (see above) – wouldn’t this mean that what has been worked out as being the gravitational constant is actually a gravitational variable?

    That brings me to another thing: the Chelyabinsk meteor was filmed just before impact as ‘burning’. Surely this friction heat (causing the loss of ?mass) would affect it’s path(?).

    Perhaps I should stop wondering about things and have a glass of Glenfiddich – that if I had any in the house!

    • Frank Davis says:

      the gravitational constant is actually a gravitational variable?

      Well, you’d almost think that it was. But it’s actually supposed to be a constant. Nevertheless, there seem to be an awful lot of values for it, even within NASA. I suppose that the exact value of these constants must get refined over time. But it seems equally true that they have a life of their own.

      the Chelyabinsk meteor was filmed just before impact as ‘burning’. Surely this friction heat (causing the loss of ?mass) would affect it’s path(?).

      Yes, it would. It would be slowed, but also ‘coriolis’ forces would tend to make it move slightly leftward from its path in the northern hemisphere (I think)

  18. petesquiz says:

    Congratulations, persistence pays off in the end! Enjoy the whisky!!

    One moral of your striving is that you have to input the correct data into a computer model to get out sensible results. If only the climate change mob had put more care into getting the right data for their models, then I might believe their pontifications!

    They could also learn, as demonstrated by your experiences, that a small discrepancy in the initial data can have a profound effect on the final output of a computer model and then admit that their models may be incorrect/flawed/not 100% accurate!

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